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On the Translation of Fear: A Study of Ecuadorian 
Kichwa Speakers and the US Immigration System 
Gustin Bova
Q&A
How did you become involved in doing research?
My experience working at the Centro Hispano here in Lawrence, where many 
clients speak an Indigenous Mexican language, and my time spent studying 
Kichwa (at KU and in Ecuador), provided me with my research idea. Then, to 
provide the helpful thrust of necessity, there was my Latin American Studies 
Capstone class (a requirement to graduate), looming closer and closer. Thus, at 
the nexus of inspiration and obligation, was my project born.
How is the research process different from what you expected?
I had to reformulate my research question profoundly. Also, it turns out that 
people, in general, are much more helpful than I originally assumed.
What is your favorite part of doing research?









Peter Haney, Assistant Director of the Center 
for Latin American & Caribbean Studies 
Bartholomew Dean, Associate Professor 
of Anthropology
AbstrAct
This study addresses the situation of Ecuadorian Kichwa-speaking migrants who, upon arriving at the 
US border (and being put into Expedited Removal), claim a fear of returning to Ecuador. The study draws 
data primarily from the Credible Fear Interview stage of this process. The author performed interviews 
with Kichwa-English interpreters who have worked in Credible Fear Interviews, and complemented this 
with bibliographic investigation. The study ultimately argues that conflicting understandings grounded 
in language, class, and culture, along with procedural issues, are likely leading officials to deny the 
Credible Fear claims, and applications for relief, of Ecuadorian Kichwa speakers at an excessive rate. The 
study draws on the experience and judgments of interpreters, viewing them as both credible experts and 
constituents of the process itself. The study concludes with questions for further research and points for 
practical consideration.
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IntROduCtIOn
Over the last few decades, 
Indigenous Latin Americans have 
migrated to the US in greater and 
greater numbers (see, e.g., Fox and 
Rivera-Salgado 2004). Many of these 
migrants, upon arriving at the US 
border, speak little to no Spanish. 
The principal sending regions for 
these migrants are Southern Mexico, 
Central America, and, to a lesser 
extent, the Andes. While these 
migrants are easily distinguished 
in their home countries, the United 
States immigration system has 
often failed to accommodate their 
linguistic and cultural distinctness. 
They have been frequently 
incarcerated, interviewed, processed 
and deported in a language they 
do not command (e.g,, Camayd-
Freixas 2008, 2009). They have, 
in criminal trials, been deemed 
mentally deficient, emotionless, 
and monstrous due to lack of 
interpretation.1 And while recent 
events, including the “border crisis” 
of 2014, have brought increased 
attention to these migrants,2 they 
remain a largely invisible and 
disadvantaged population within the 
US legal system. 
Although scholars have worked 
to address closely related issues, 
there is a dearth of research on 
this particular topic. For example, 
legal scholars have worked to 
establish the right to interpretation 
in one’s best language, even for 
undocumented migrants who speak 
rare languages (Ackermann 2010; 
Davis et al. 2004; León 2014). And 
anthropologists and linguists have 
analyzed the interface of Indigenous 
defendants and Neo-colonial 
legal systems—particularly in the 
Australian and Alaskan contexts 
(Cooke 2002; Eades 2008; Morrow 
1993). And finally, scholars in the 
field of interpreting/translation 
studies have done extensive work 
unsettling notions of interpretation, 
cross-cultural communication, and 
language comprehension in legal 
settings (Hale 2008; Hertog 2002; 
Mikkelson 2008). However, research 
remains scant on Indigenous Latin 
American migrants and the US 
legal system—on the nature of 
communication in these encounters 
and the implications for due process 
(one exception being León 2014). 
In this paper, I seek to examine 
the interactions of a particular 
population with a particular aspect 
of the US legal system: namely, those 
of Ecuadorian Kichwa-speaking 
migrants3 with the Credible Fear 
Interview (and, by extension, the 
full Merits Hearing). In doing so, I 
seek not only to expose a problem 
but to explain its nature in detail, 
in order to strengthen efforts 
at reform. I ultimately conclude 
that conflicting understandings 
grounded in language, class, and 
culture, along with procedural 
issues, are likely leading officials to 
deny the Credible Fear claims, and 
applications for relief, of Ecuadorian 
Kichwa speakers at an excessive rate. 
While the claim is indeed modest, 
it accounts fairly for the study’s 
limitations, and the discussion that 
supports it applies to a broad array of 
immigrant populations.
I. MEthOdOLOgY
 To begin, my principle method of 
discovery for this study was the 
qualitative interview. I performed 5 
one hour-long interviews with three 
Kichwa-English legal interpreters: 
Kinti, Charlie Uruchima, and 
Amy. I performed the interviews 
primarily in English (although I 
also speak Spanish at an advanced 
level, and Kichwa at an intermediate 
level). Three of these interviews 
were performed with one interpreter: 
Kinti, so the majority of my data 
come from my conversations with 
her. Throughout the work, I consider 
my interviewees’ accounts to be 
both raw data on legal processes 
themselves and authoritative analysis 
of those processes (plus related 
political and cultural phenomena). I 
attempt to engage both aspects of my 
collaborators’ contributions in order to 
illuminate the multi-faceted, historical 
and transnational interactions that 
they described for me. Ultimately, 
the lack of certain quantitative data4, 
the small number of interviewees, 
and the inability to perform direct 
observation substantially limit this 
study, but it is my hope that it will 




SPEaKERS; thE CREdIBLE 
FEaR IntERVIEW
Ecuadorian Kichwa
For starters, it is generally agreed 
upon that there are approximately 
two million speakers of Ecuadorian 
Kichwa (e.g., Adelaar and Muysken 
two Kichwa women outside their home.
1. See the cases of Nicolas Dutan Guaman and María Guaman Guaman, which are discussed in greater detail in a forthcoming MA thesis by 
Charlie Uruchima (New York University)
2. See, for example, “Immigrants Who Speak Indigenous Languages Encounter Isolation” (New York Times 2014), or “Language Barriers Pose 
Challenges For Mayan Migrant Children” (NPR 2014).
3. A note on terminology: I will switch between the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘applicant’ in this work, depending on what I want to emphasize. 
4. Namely, the precise success rate of Ecuadorian Kichwa-speakers in the Credible Fear Interview or Merits Hearing. The available quantitative 
evidence only allows us to see that Ecuadorians in general are relatively unsuccessful at getting Asylum in particular (only one part of the overall 
process), which is suggestive but not conclusive (see: EOIR Asylum Statistics Chart). 
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2004, 620). These speakers are 
concentrated in the Andean 
highlands, with greatest prevalence 
in the provinces of Imbabura, 
Chimborazo, and the Azuayo-
Cañari region. Their language is 
the Ecuadorian variant of the larger 
language Quechua, which is spoken 
throughout the Andean region.5 
This language owes its expansion 
to the Incan Empire, which used it 
as the language of administration. 
Like all Indigenous communities 
in the Americas, Kichwa speakers 
have suffered greatly under colonial 
and neocolonial regimes, and they 
continue to face discrimination/
racism from the dominant mestizo 
population. Today, Kichwa survives 
in rural areas and the commercial 
tourist center of Otavalo. Many 
Kichwa speakers also speak Spanish, 
and all speakers use a certain 
amount of Spanish loanwords. 
Currently, Kichwa is endangered 
in most communities of use. This 
rather bleak picture is offset by the 
Indigenous political movements that 
rocked Ecuador throughout the 1990s, 
and Kichwa’s status 
as an official language 
of Ecuador, but, all in 
all, Kichwa culture and 
language face a complex, 
uncertain future, full of 
mixing, adaptation, and, 
potentially, great loss.
As for the migration 
of Ecuadorians to the 
United States, it is more 
substantial than many 
might think. According 
to 2010 Census data, 
there are around 665,000 
Ecuadorians in the US, 
making Ecuador the 
9th largest source of 
“Hispanic” migrants in 
the US (Motel and Patten 
2012).6 As Jason Pribilsky, 
an ethnographer of Ecuadorian 
migration, reports, approximately 
70% of these migrants come from 
the Azuayo-Cañari region (Pribilsky 
2007, 8), a largely rural region with 
a substantial Kichwa-speaking 
population. As for these migrants’ 
target location in the US, the Pew 
Center reports that 66% reside in 
the Northeast region, with 40% 
residing in the New York Metro Area 
(Brown and Patten 2013). There are 
no concrete statistics on the number 
of Kichwa-speaking Ecuadorian 
migrants in the US; however, one 
source (an apparently Evangelical 
Protestant organization), estimates 
the New York area Kichwa-speaking 
population at 10,000 (All Peoples 
Initiative 2010).
credible Fear Interview
The Credible Fear Interview process 
was created in 1991, by the former 
Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, to address an influx of 
Haitians fleeing that year’s coup 
d’etat (USCIS 2012a, 9). Then, in 
1996, with the amendment of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, the 
Credible Fear process took on new 
importance, as the new legislation 
created the process of Expedited 
Removal. Today, after expansions 
in 2002 and 2004, the Expedited 
Removal process looks like this: if 
a migrant arrives without a valid 
document of entry, or with a falsified 
document, and is picked up by US 
Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) either at a designated port of 
entry, at-sea, or within 100 miles of 
a US land border (without proof of at 
least 14 days’ continuous presence), 
then CBP may enter that migrant 
into Expedited Removal (Howard, 
Accessed 2015). What this means 
is that the migrant will be swiftly 
deported, without any hearing before 
an Immigration Judge, unless he/she7 
is able to claim an exception. The 
most common of these exceptions 
is claiming fear of returning to 
one’s country of nationality. When 
a migrant makes this claim, CBP 
refers her to a U.S Citizenship 
and Immigration Services Asylum 
Office for a Credible Fear Interview. 
Meanwhile Immigrations and 
Custom Enforcement detains her 
(Campos and Friedland 2014). 
Ultimately, the result of the Credible 
Fear Interview will determine 
whether a migrant gets to have a full 
hearing before an Immigration Judge. 
I provide, for reference, Graphic 
1 (next page), which lays out the 
application for relief process that 
these migrants face. 
The Credible Fear Interview 
itself is typically a 45 minute-1 
hour long interview, conducted by 
an Asylum Officer. In it, the officer 
follows a somewhat standard script 
of questions. He asks first about 
basic background information, 
including whether the migrant has 
family members in the US. Then, 
he asks whether the migrant has a 
Map of Ecuador—the provinces with the largest 
Kichwa-speaking populations circled in red. 
Wikimedia commons 2015 
5 It may be more accurate to describe Quechua as a language family, since the differences between ‘dialects’ can be as great as the differences 
between the Romance languages. Given that interpretation, Ecuadorian Kichwa would be a language unto itself within the larger family.
6 Peru and Venezuela, nearby countries twice the size of Ecuador, both account for fewer US migrants.
7 From here on out, I will switch gender pronouns freely.
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fear of returning to her country of 
nationality. If yes, the officer asks 
a number of follow-up questions.8 
In doing so, the officer seeks to 
establish evidence (or lack thereof) 
that the migrant has a Credible Fear 
of Persecution and/or Torture. These 
terms, “persecution” and “torture,” 
are distinct, legal terms, with a 
number of Board of Immigration 
Appeals and federal court decisions 
informing their interpretation. In 
a nutshell, “persecution” is the 
basis on which a person applies 
for Asylum/Refugee status, and 
it consists of: “serious harm or 
suffering inflicted on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political 
opinion,” specifically when the 
perpetrator of such harm is “either the 
government or a non-governmental 
entity that the government is 
unwilling or unable to control” 
(USCIS 2012a, 20). In turn, “torture” 
is the basis on which a person 
applies for Withholding/Deferral of 
Removal9, and it consists of: “some 
action that would result in serious 
physical or mental harm” that is 
“inflicted by or at the instigation of, or 
with the consent or acquiescence of, 
a government official or other person 
acting in an official capacity” (USCIS 
2012a, 35). These are the operational 
definitions that provide the basis 
for Asylum Officers’ determinations 
(and for Immigration Judges’ 
decisions in full hearings).
A final, important note is that 
Credible Fear has traditionally 
been easy to establish, with success 
rates of over 80% (USCIS Credible 
Fear Workload Summaries). This 
is because Asylum Officers do 
not make full judgments of an 
applicant’s case, but instead 
seek only to establish whether 
the applicant has a “significant 
possibility” of establishing eligibility 
(for Asylum or Withholding) in 
a full hearing before a Judge 
(USCIS 2012a). In February 2014, 
however, the Asylum Division of 
the USCIS released revisions to 
their instructional materials for 
Asylum Officers that raised the 
Standard of Proof used in Credible 
Fear Interviews (memo, Lafferty 
2014). USCIS workload summaries 
after February 2014 suggest that 
these revisions have already led 
to markedly decreased success 
rates. The essential context for 
these revisions, as Campos and 
Friedland argue in a 2014 article for 
the Immigration Policy Center, is 
a conservative political backlash 
against supposed “asylum abuse” 
(Campos and Friedland 2014).10 It is 
in this politicized context, then, that 
Ecuadorian Kichwa speakers enter 
the Credible Fear Interview.
III. MY IntERVIEWS: ISSuES 
OF LanguagE, CuLtuRE, 
CLaSS, and PROCEduRE
A. What Kichwa speakers Are 
Actually claiming
To contextualize the following 
analysis, I want to begin by 
explaining, in concrete terms, the 
sorts of persecution/torture that 
Kichwa speakers are actually 
claiming. As a jumping off point: 
Shoshanna Malett writes in an 
online article that “the most 
common claims from Ecuador are 
those of Ecuadorians fleeing gang 
violence and trafficking, [while] [t]
here are also numerous claims of 
domestic abuse” (Malett, Accessed 
2015). Regarding Kichwa speakers 
in particular, my interviews support 
8 This questioning is, in theory, “non-adversarial” (USCIS 2012c). But, officers do probe for contradictions in the applicant’s statements, and 
my interview data suggest that this can turn the interview adversarial, thus making lack of legal counsel (which is the norm, especially for 
Indigenous migrants) particularly problematic.
9 A harder-to-obtain form of relief, that offers fewer benefits than Asylum, but that is available to some who are otherwise barred. Applicants 
typically apply for Asylum and Withholding simultaneously.
10 See, for example, the Dec. 2013 U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee hearing titled “Asylum Abuse: Is It Overwhelming Our 
Borders?”. Or, from Feb. 2014: “Asylum Fraud: Abusing America’s Compassion?”.
Graphic 1: the overall process
Note: Ecuadorians are consistently among the top 5 nationalities for Credible Fear 
Interviews performed (USCIS Statistics), but, as mentioned, they rarely end up with 
successful Asylum Claims (Merits Hearing stage)
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the notion that some are making 
claims based on gang violence, 
and trafficking/the drug trade. In 
the most detailed instance, my 
interviewee Kinti described a man 
employed as a janitor in central 
Ecuador who was recruited against 
his will to work as a drug mule by 
higher-ups in his company. He faced 
threats of violence if he attempted 
to quit, so he fled the country. 
Additionally, my data support, 
strongly, the prevalence of domestic 
violence claims among Kichwa-
speaking women. 
There are also, however, two 
other common claims among 
Kichwa speakers that Malett does 
not recognize: namely, local-
level political persecution and 
religious persecution. Regarding 
the first claim, in response to 
a question about what types of 
situations Ecuadorians are fleeing, 
my interviewee Kinti offered the 
following:
K: it has appeared that, uh, few cases 
have shown that women, or man, have 
been kind of threatened by the political 
parties. For example that, there were 
a few instances I have interpreted 
that, list 35, which is the government 
list party, has been threatening to 
the people: if you don’t work for me, 
this is what’s gonna happen, or they 
just beat up. It’s not the government 
directly acting, acting on the people, 
but they’re locals, local governments, 
like, small local governments in the 
communities, for example, who are 
working for Correa’s party, for example. 
They are the ones who are kind of, 
um, bullying them, other people who 
are working with the Pachakutik, for 
example, and that case has gotten a 
little too much for some people…
Additionally, Kinti confirmed 
elsewhere that these local-level 
intimidations do sometimes 
reach the level of physical assault, 
including surprise group-beatings 
and even the use of guns. Her 
explanations, however, are probably 
opaque without a background 
of Ecuadorian politics. To give 
only the basics: Alianza País is 
the dominant political party in 
Ecuador; it is the President’s party, 
and, while it initially drew support 
from Indigenous movements, it 
has ultimately proven unfriendly 
to Indigenous sovereignty and 
collective rights. Lista 35, or “list 
35,” is a synonym for the party, 
representing the party’s numerical 
location on the Ecuadorian ballot. 
Pachakutik, on the other hand, is a 
leftist, agrarian-Indigenous political 
party that has had some success 
in mainstream Ecuadorian politics, 
and generally opposes the politics 
of Correa (the President) and his 
party. With that background in place, 
we can look at the claim Kinti is 
relaying: namely, that Alianza País, 
at the local level, is using violence 
to intimidate Kichwa-speaking 
Ecuadorians who are involved in 
Pachakutik and refuse to support 
Lista 35. They are doing so without 
explicit directives from Rafael Correa, 
but one could argue that they are 
doing so with implicit permission/
acquiescence from the government 
(see persecution definition above). 
The second claim overlooked 
by Malett, as already mentioned, 
is that of religious persecution. In 
one discussion on the topic, Kinti 
transitioned out of a story about 
discrimination in Ecuadorian cities, 
and into the following:
K: It’s, the rest is pretty much, either 
the community, in the community, 
or religion, because he or she’s 
Protestant—
G: Ohh yeah
K: That’s an issue; he or she is 
Protestant. And the rest are catholic 
drunkards who are trying to beat them 
and that kind of thing; that’s the kind 
of thing that they will say. And besides 
that… their beliefs change and their 
parents or relatives, also, are against 
the change of religion.
This short exchange sums up 
the overall point well enough. 
For context: it’s been a common 
practice for decades now for foreign, 
Evangelical missionaries to pursue 
Kichwa-speaking Ecuadorians 
as potential converts. When 
these Kichwas do convert, from a 
syncretic version of Catholicism 
to Evangelical Christianity, they 
change a number of important 
behaviors. And furthermore, since 
it is individuals who convert, rather 
than whole communities, tensions 
are created between the converts 
and their own communities. For 
example, Kinti’s jest about “catholic 
drunkards” refers to the fact that 
evangelicos give up alcohol—which 
is, of course, very important in 
the syncretic Catholic-Indigenous 
raymis (festivals). Beyond simply not 
drinking, these converts will often 
not participate at all in community 
raymis, disapproving of the dancing 
and various forms of “idolatry.” 
This non-participation in essential 
community functions creates a 
divide within the ayllu (community) 
that sometimes, as Kinti reports, 
bubbles over into physical assaults. 
In sum, then, the four major bases 
of Kichwa speakers’ Credible Fear 
claims are: drug and gang-related 
trafficking/violence, domestic abuse, 
local-level political persecution, and 
religious persecution.11
b. “simple” Questions 
with complicated Answers: 
relocation and Injury
Relocation. I turn now to two 
interview questions whose 
explication touches on a host of 
larger issues. Regarding the first 
question: at a certain point in the 
11 An important note here is that Asylum Officers test all of these claims against Department of State Reports on country conditions. To briefly sum 
up the Reports on Ecuador: they generally deny government complicity in harm to Indigenous people, and they do not mention the local-level 
political persecution or Evangelical-Catholic conflicts that Kinti describes (US DoS 2013, 2013, 2014). This downplaying and absence of issues is 
likely to undermine the strength of some otherwise valid claims.
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Credible Fear Interview, after having 
heard some/all of an applicant’s basis 
for Fear, the Asylum Officer will 
ask about the possibility of internal 
relocation. For Ecuadorian migrants, 
the question is typically along the 
lines of “can you move somewhere 
else in Ecuador and be safe?,” or 
“why can’t you just move to a city in 
Ecuador, like Quito, or Guayaquil?.” 
This simple question is essential to 
the Asylum Officer’s analysis of the 
applicant’s case, since, as Officers 
are informed by their instructional 
materials, the ability to safely relocate 
internally may be sufficient basis for a 
negative Credible Fear finding (USCIS 
2012a, 23). Furthermore, the February 
2014 revisions (mentioned above) to 
those instructional materials urge 
Officers to give more weight than 
before to the possibility of internal 
relocation (Lafferty 2014). This simple 
question, then, currently carries more 
weight than ever.
My primary collaborator, Kinti, 
quoted a number of the answers 
that Kichwa speakers usually give 
to this question of relocation. We 
discussed the topic a number of 
times, but the following excerpt is 
most representative:
G: And when the officer asks, cuz the 
officer asks, right, like, why can’t you 
just move to Quito? What exactly do 
people respond to that? 
K: If that’s the case, then their response 
most often is that we don’t know 
anybody, uh, for example, the freshest 
thing I can remember yesterday was 
a case she said, this woman said you 
know, I don’t have anybody in Quito 
or anybody close to the cities, I don’t 
have anything, I am indigenous person 
therefore I am, I am denied all the work 
possibilities and there’s no such jobs 
or anything. I can’t go anywhere. And 
I don’t want to return where they’re 
gonna kill me…
G: … and it’s just, so it’s just like, mana 
pitachu char-charini [Translation: I don’t 
ha-have anyone]? Or how do they say it?
K: They will say mana, mana pita 
riksinichu, llankanichu, manapi, 
mana llankayta charinichu, mana 
pita llaktapi riksinichu nin, mana 
ayllukunata llaktakunapi charinichu; 
mishukuna makan nin, mishukuna 
riman, shina nishpa nin [Translation: 
no, no I don’t know anyone, I don’t work, 
no one, I don’t have work, I don’t know 
anyone there, they say, I don’t have family 
in those places; mestizos hit, they say, 
mestizos insult, that’s what they say].
We see, then, in Kinti’s rendition, 
that the Kichwa-speaking migrants 
feel alienated from Ecuadorian 
cities on three grounds: one, lack 
of family, two, lack of work, and 
three, discrimination/abuse. The first 
ground, lack of family, is given its 
particular meaning by the context 
of rural Ecuador. These Kichwa-
speaking migrants are from tiny 
towns in the Andean countryside, 
where the main support network is 
the ayllu, a community composed 
primarily of extended family 
members (although, as Pribilsky 
argues, migration from Ecuador has 
been rapidly changing this). Many 
of these Kichwa-speaking migrants 
have spent their whole lives in this 
small-town context, where everyone 
is related to everyone, and many 
of them have never traveled to 
other areas of Ecuador (particularly 
the women). The second ground, 
lack of work in the cities, refers to 
the incompatibility of the rural-
agricultural skillset with the big 
city labor markets. While many 
Indigenous folks who live close 
to urban centers travel to sell 
vegetables in open markets, they 
can only do so because they have 
land in a nearby rural area. The 
prospects for a Kichwa speaker of 
finding permanent work in a city are 
bleak. The options largely consist 
of informal work as an ambulatory 
salesperson of cheap consumer 
goods like candy and cigarettes, or 
folkloric artesanía, if one has the time 
and resources to make it. It’s also 
possible for women to find domestic 
cleaning work (which is low-paid 
and unprotected), and for men to 
find a limited amount of construction 
work. The issue, however, is not only 
scarcity/availability of jobs; it’s also 
the discrimination and abuse they 
face both within urban workplaces 
and on the street (“mestizos hit”; 
“mestizos insult”). Kichwa speakers 
face extensive exploitation and verbal, 
physical, and sexual abuse at the 
hands of some patrones in the big 
cities, and, beyond that, they may be 
subject to abuse by random passersby, 
simply for being present in the city. 
This is because Ecuadorian urban 
society, at its worst, sees these indios 
as filthy, backwards, and, crucially, as 
belonging only in certain spaces. For 
all these reasons, Kichwa speakers 
do not want to relocate internally, 
particularly to the big cities (which 
are seen by Asylum Officers as 
providing anonymity and protection). 
This explanation, however, even 
if a Kichwa speaker provides it 
in detail (which is often not the 
case), may still prove insufficient. 
As Kinti recounted during one 
conversation, the Officer will often 
turn to questioning how it is that the 
person can migrate to an entirely 
different country (the US), but not to 
a different part of her own country. 
The answer to this question that 
would likely help Kichwa speakers’ 
cases is that Ecuadorian government 
officials are systematically 
persecuting them, and they therefore 
cannot seek safety elsewhere in 
the country. That, however, is not 
the case in Ecuador. Some officials, 
then, might see that as reason 
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enough to deny Credible Fear (or 
relief). However, there is a more 
subtle, but very real, answer to the 
question of why Ecuadorian Kichwas 
would relocate to the US rather than 
Quito. In my interview with Charlie 
Uruchima, I reiterated the question 
about internal relocation, which led 
to the following exchange:
G: Did—what are your thoughts 
about that question, did you hear that 
question?
C: Yeah, I heard that question; I think 
she [the Kichwa speaker in a CFI that he 
interpreted for, on the one occasion that 
he has done so] said she didn’t know 
anybody else outside of her town. But 
that’s, I mean, also, migration culture is 
huge… places like Cañar, people today, 
that’s where you find a lot of, they have 
a lot of like young people coming, still 
migrating today, because their parents 
have migrated already, so, they see 
migration as… like a reunion.
G: A reunion?
C: Yeah. And I mean I was thinking 
more like the migration culture, culture 
aspect of it. But I mean there’s also like 
tangential reasons for it as well. You 
know it’s, it’s like well if something 
happens, and then… especially as 
traumatizing as like, for example, her 
case, if something like that happens, 
then you already know, like, well, 
everybody else is doing it, so I guess, 
now I have to do it…




C: And that’s what I feel like, [?], it 
makes the decision easier you know?
Charlie, then, who is a graduate 
student, reiterates the Kichwa 
speakers’ explanation of not 
knowing anyone in other areas of 
the country, but then proceeds to 
introduce a new element: “migration 
culture.” In the academic literature, 
this term is usually found as 
“culture(s) of migration.” The term 
refers to how migration can become 
“deeply ingrained into the repertoire 
of people’s behavior, and [how] 
values associated with migration 
become part of the community’s 
values” (Massey et al. 1998, 47). 
In his works, Jeffrey H. Cohen 
clarifies the term further, arguing, 
in the context of Oaxaca, that a 
culture of migration exists where: 
one, “migration is pervasive—it 
occurs throughout the region and 
has a historical presence”; two, “the 
decision to migrate is one that 
people make as part of their everyday 
experiences [italics mine]”; and 
three, “the decision to migrate is 
accepted by most… as one path 
toward economic well-being” (2004, 
5). Finally, as Cohen emphasizes 
in a later work, the idea of cultures 
of migration is underpinned by the 
belief that migrants are “rational 
social actors,” and—particularly 
relevant for this analysis—“[e]
ven… refugees who flee cultural, 
economic, religious, and social 
problems and persecution in their 
home communities and nations 
are typically making calculated 
decisions about their futures” 
(Cohen and Sirkeci 2011, 13). 
My interviewee Charlie 
Uruchima, in the passage 
above, refers to Cañar as a site of 
“migration culture.” We’ve already 
discussed that the Azuayo-Cañari 
region accounts for the majority of 
Ecuadorian-US migration, but we 
haven’t discussed what that looks 
like in those communities. Having 
traveled to Cañar myself, I can 
vouch from personal experience that 
some feel as though the middle has 
been cut out from them. Essentially, 
the older generation is there, and 
children are there, but the young 
adults—those of most productive 
working age—are gone (hence 
Charlie’s observation of young 
migrants following their parents). 
As a sign of this, one sometimes 
observes big US-style houses, built 
by remittances, to which migrants 
have never returned. In his work, 
Pribilsky discusses this transnational 
economic system of migration and 
remittances that Azuayo-Cañari 
families depend on (Pribilsky 
2007). For this reason, when a rural 
Kichwa speaker in those regions 
experiences an act of persecution, 
the notion of migration—as a 
means of escaping, of achieving, of 
reuniting—is already profoundly 
present in his mind and social 
surroundings. We even see Charlie 
go so far as to suggest that reasons 
other than migration culture are 
“tangential,” while simultaneously 
emphasizing the legitimate trauma 
of the Kichwa speaker he interpreted 
for. Ultimately, we see him conclude 
that migration culture and the 
traumatizing event, together, make 
the overall migration decision 
“easier” than it would otherwise be. 
The train of thought that Charlie 
lays out could lead one to question 
the validity of Ecuadorian Kichwa 
speakers’ asylum claims (asylum, 
after all, exists for the persecuted, 
not simply for migrants seeking 
economic well-being).12 I would 
argue, however, that it shouldn’t 
do so. As Cohen and Sirkeci argue 
in the passage quoted earlier, even 
refugees, when they migrate, are 
making “calculated decisions about 
their futures.” To grapple adequately 
with the diasporic and transnational 
world of today, we have to be willing 
to accept the complex considerations 
that motivate both migration and 
requests for protection. We need to 
look at the claims of, for example, 
Ecuadorian Kichwa speakers, 
through a multi-faceted lens. When 
they experience acts of persecution/
torture, these acts are immediately 
contextualized within patterns 
of migration that are profoundly 
economic in nature. The motives 
may comingle. And we have to 
consider that, for Ecuadorian Kichwa 
speakers, the closest thing to home, 
apart from their rural Ecuadorian 
12 With the same logic applying equally to Withholding of Removal and Torture.
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ayllu, may not be Quito or another 
area of Ecuador, but rather New York 
City. It may be that Spring Valley, NY, 
for instance, is the only other place 
where they have blood-relations, and, 
therefore, accepting community. 
Injury. Turning now to the second 
not-so-simple question, I start with 
the fact that Asylum Officers—as 
they seek information about the 
potential persecution/torture that 
an applicant has experienced—try 
to elicit specific information about 
the injuries that the applicant 
suffered. In doing so, Officers 
probe for discrete, at-least-vaguely 
medical injuries to record: “broken 
wrist,” for example, or “lacerated 
forehead.” The Officer seeks this 
information for two reasons: one, to 
establish the severity of the harm 
inflicted, and, two, to establish 
credibility. Regarding the second 
point, the migrant needs to recall 
in detail the nature and duration of 
her injuries, and remain consistent 
in her story. All of this may seem 
necessary and unproblematic to 
the reader, but, on many occasions, 
Kichwa speakers offer answers that 
are both unsatisfactory to Officers, 
and that do not accurately represent 
their cases. For example, in the case 
of a beating, a Kichwa speaker may 
describe what his assailants did to 
him, but, when pressed for the exact 
injuries he suffered, simply describe 
again the actions of his assailants. 
Kichwa speakers often also give 
contradictory/vague accounts about 
when exactly incidents occurred. 
Tellingly, Officers also always ask 
whether the applicant saw a doctor, 
and, if not, then “why not.” And 
therein lies the issue. In essence, 
the Officer’s expectations around 
injuries are rooted in a society (or 
class within a society) that goes 
to and listens to doctors. In other 
words, the Officer bears/represents 
a particular set of medico-cultural 
norms. The Kichwa speaker, on 
the other hand, has usually not 
seen a medical doctor because of 
geographical distance, cultural 
difference, a language barrier, or the 
chance that the doctor is prejudiced 
against indios. Without a medical 
doctor’s diagnosis, the Kichwa 
speaker may not know exactly what 
injuries he suffered (or, if he went 
to a traditional healer [yachak], he 
may have a diagnosis that will 
not translate well in the Interview 
context). To make matters worse, 
without the medical doctor’s visit, he 
also lacks a record of when exactly 
the injuries occurred. Taking all 
of this together, then, the Kichwa 
speaker may seem imprecise about 
both the exact nature of his injuries 
and when they occurred, which 
may, for the Officer, undermine the 
apparent severity of the case and/or 
the applicant’s credibility.
To make all of this a little more 
complex, there also exist a number 
of particularities surrounding gender 
and gender-based violence. In one 
interview, Kinti transitioned from a 
discussion of translating the word 
“torture” into the following:
K: Even if [they are] wounded, 
sometimes the person does not want 
to tell those private things, that’s like 
an intrusion, private matter can be 
described in part, another thing, that’s 
another thing that they don’t want 
to, especially women, for women to 
describe all those injuries that they 
have received; they don’t really wanna 
tell, they just tell superficial things 
and they think if they do describe 
the details of what happened to them, 
might be, I don’t know, but they don’t 
want to so…
Kinti, then, moves from a 
translation difficulty (“torture”) 
into the issues of privacy and 
“intrusion.” This demonstrates that 
communication of harm revolves 
not only around terminology but 
also around culturally-situated 
communicative competence. Put simply, 
this concept represents the fact that 
people learn not only how to say 
things, but also when, where, and 
with whom to say them, a process 
labeled acquisition of competence 
(Hymes 1971). In the case of the 
Credible Fear Interview, the Asylum 
Officer behaves incompetently 
by requesting details that aren’t 
appropriate for the female Kichwa 
speaker to give (particularly to an 
often opposite-gendered stranger). 
And the Kichwa speaker responds 
by providing only the “superficial” 
amount of detail that is appropriate. 
As Kinti stated in another interview, 
regarding Kichwa speakers talking 
about physical harm:
K: … if the man, or somebody has 
done it, private parts, [it] just… sounds 
too ridiculous. Even the word doesn’t 
sound even appropriate to even come 
up with.
These notions of what is 
“ridiculous” and “appropriate” 
are grounded in strong cultural 
understandings of what can be 
said, where and to whom. Kichwa-
speaking women (particularly 
without any previous legal advice) 
are likely to hue to these notions 
of what’s appropriate during the 
interview—to the detriment of their 
cases. Taken altogether, then, when 
Asylum officers elicit information 
about harm experienced by Kichwa 
speakers, they tend to impose a 
distinct medico-cultural system, and 
to violate gendered communication 
norms—and, as a result, they 
may reach erroneous conclusions 
about severity of harm, or about an 
applicant’s credibility.
 
c. Issues of Interpretation Per se 
Terminology. A first lens for looking 
at issues of interpretation per se 
in these interviews is that of legal 
terminology. For starters, any 
interpreter who needs to translate 
the peculiar register of Legal English 
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into a non-European language will 
encounter substantial difficulty, 
lacking the assistance of common 
Latin and Greek roots. And these 
difficulties are, naturally, much 
greater when working with a 
language like Kichwa, whose 
speakers come from small-scale 
societies, free of elaborate legal 
bureaucracies. Here, issues of culture, 
class and education all intermingle. 
For instance, on the one hand, many 
Kichwa speakers maintain a radically 
distinct legal system, a community 
justice system that involves public 
shamings, beatings and cold-water 
baths,13 with its own concepts 
and rationale. On the other hand, 
Kichwa speakers are simultaneously 
subject to the Ecuadorian national 
legal system, a system that is 
more-or-less similar to the US legal 
system. This means that Kichwa 
speakers could have the chance to 
acquire comparable terminology. 
However, Kichwa speakers are likely 
to have had no interactions with that 
national legal system (or to have 
had only alienating and antagonistic 
ones). Arguably, this is because 
Kichwa Indigeneity, in Ecuador, is 
simultaneously a class-marker. To 
speak Kichwa predominantly means, 
unequivocally, to have received very 
little State education and to have 
very little money14, which is a social 
position from which the official legal 
system will appear opaque/hostile. 
These issues of language, culture, 
class, and education all intertwine to 
make translating legal terminology 
into Kichwa especially difficult.
 A particularly interesting element 
of this terminological dilemma, for 
interpreters, is the issue of when 
to use Spanish terms (and/or 
Kichwacized Spanish terms), rather 
than attempting a fully Kichwa 
equivalent. There is, on the one hand, 
a fairly unproblematic manifestation 
of this, in which the Kichwa speaker 
simply understands the Spanish 
term more readily than an equivalent 
Kichwa neologism15. For example, 
most Kichwa speakers are more 
familiar with gobierno than the 
properly Kichwa equivalent kamachik. 
Additionally, another unproblematic 
phenomenon is when a Kichwacized 
Spanish word has become the 
norm in a community, and is more 
precise than a natively Kichwa 
equivalent. For example, decidina 
is a Kichwacization of the Spanish 
infinitive decidir; a more purely 
Kichwa equivalent would be arinina 
[literally ‘to say yes’], but, since that 
word may mean to decide, to commit, 
to agree, or to consent, it may be best 
to use the more precise, Spanish-
derived term. There arises, however, 
a more problematic situation when a 
Spanish term may not be understood 
by the Kichwa speaker, but, since the 
Kichwa equivalent is equally unclear 
or would take too long (dicussed in 
greater detail below), the interpreter 
feels compelled to use the Spanish 
term anyways. For example, Kinti 
provides an explanation for the 
term única oportunidad, which she 
sometimes leaves in Spanish:
K: Única oportunidad. I have, that’s 
only opportunity you have, so, what 
am I gonna say? Kunan, kaypika 
tukuyta ninki. Kunanman, chay kipaka 
mana ima tiyankachu [Now, here you 
say everything. After now, there will not 
be anything]. Maybe that’s it.
As we see, the original term 
loses precision in the Kichwa 
version, and the Kichwa version 
is substantially longer. And since 
the Kichwa speaker will likely not 
understand the original Spanish 
term, the interpreter ends up stuck 
between two undesirable options. 
Fundamentally, this issue hinges 
on the opaque nature of the legal 
register, which is further exacerbated 
in the Kichwa language context.
The Ontology of Harm. Building 
on the issues just discussed, a more 
profound translation problem exists 
around the concept of “harm”—
an essential component of the 
persecution and torture definitions 
listed earlier. In the Asylum Officers’ 
instructional materials, we find 
that either physical or mental harm 
may be the basis for a persecution 
claim or a torture claim (USCIS 
2012a). The underlying philosophical 
notion, then, is that the realms of the 
physical and mental are distinct, but 
both can be the site of something 
called “harm.” Furthermore, in a 
legal sense, this “harm” may or 
may not be sufficient to ground 
a persecution/torture claim. It is 
the Asylum Officer’s job to elicit 
information about the type of harm 
experienced and its severity.16 My 
collaborator Kinti and I discussed 
the issues around communicating 
harm in all three of our interviews. 
By the time we had the following 
exchange, I had already understood 
the basic idea, and was trying to 
elicit the actual language involved: 
G: Um, so you’re saying one, one hard 
thing is like the idea of harm, like harm 
in Kichwa is a general—
K: Harm in Kichwa. Idea… is like 
Chukriy
G: Chukriy
K: Chukriy is the harm, physical 
harm… now Chukriy in the 
psychological, there is no description 
for it … 
G: You can’t say chukriy umapi [harm 
in the head] or something like that?
K: You can say chukriy umapi, so 
umapi will be physical wound on your 
head
G: Oh, right.
13 Altogether called La ley indígena, as recogized in the Ecuadorian constitution.
14 With the possible exception of the Otavaleño merchant class.
15 Words typically developed and promoted by (bilingual) Kichwa professors and Indigenous activists that often do not take hold in rural 
Kichwa communities.
16 On a related note, in the earlier mentioned 2014 memo, the Asylum Division chief described new specifications as to what mental pain or suffering 
may constitute torture. Given the memo’s political context, we know that this means new limitations on what claims can constitute torture—thus 
encouraging officers to reject more claims and/or restrict their questioning to physical harm.
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K: So, it wouldn’t be, it might be 
shunkupi [in the heart] (laughs)
G: Shunkupi
K: Shunkupi, maybe that might be 
the only word might suit for that 
because chukriy is emotional, mental, 
everything, hm-mm, it’s all included 
in there, it’s a bundle … and the only 
word that I can use for emotional or 
psychological is ‘have you become 
crazy because of it?’
G: Uh-huh
K: … ‘did you get like crazy,’ ‘you are 
lost your mind or something?’
G: What’s-what’s--
K: Uma-uma-uma illak tukurkanki? 
[Did you become cra-cra-crazy? Literally: 
without a head] (laughs)
G: Uma illak tukurkanki, uh-huh
K: Shunku illak. Uh, chinkarishka 
tukurkanki. [Without a heart. Uh, did 
you become lost?]
G: That, ok, sure.
K: So, uh, those kinds of things might 
reflect them to think differently from 
the physical harm.
G: Hm-mm. That, so that might sort of 
work, but…
K: Sort of not quite exactly.
We see, then, in Kinti’s 
explanation, that chukriy’s principal 
meaning is physical harm; however, 
the term’s full meaning includes 
psychological/mental/emotional 
harm as well. The particular 
difficulties arise when one needs to 
distinguish types of harm. Altogether, 
I theorize from my interviews that 
the concept of harm leads to a 
two-fold problem in Credible Fear 
Interviews with Kichwa speakers: 
1. The Officer asks about
general“harm” experienced, 
implicitly seeking either physical 
or psychological harm, but the 
translation into Kichwa leads to 
responses exclusively about 
physical harm, or
2. The Officer asks specifically 
about psychological harm/
torture, but the distinction cannot 
be effectively translated.
In the first case, while both types 
of harm are absolutely relevant to 
the claim, the simple term chukriy 
may elicit only part of a person’s 
story, and, if the Officer does not 
ask more follow-up questions, that 
part may be lost. In the second case, 
if the Officer does try specifically to 
elicit information about non-physical 
harm, and does so using phrases 
like psychological or emotional pain/
harm/torture, the interpreter has a 
difficult time translating the phrases. 
Kinti recounts that sometimes she 
has had to ask the person if she went 
crazy, as the best way to get across 
the notion of psychological harm. 
This, as she explained in another 
interview, has its own consequences, 
since the person will often get 
defensive and reply in the negative. 
All of this has serious implications, 
since this 45 minute-1 hour long 
interview is generally an applicant’s 
única oportunidad to get their story 
across, and if miscommunications 
occur around the nature and 
severity of harm inflicted, it may 
sink an entire claim. In fact, a 
central point that Kinti re-iterated to 
me, throughout our talks, was that 
many Kichwa-speaking applicants, 
especially women, have experienced 
psychological torture, but that lack 
of awareness about what is relevant 
to their claims, lack of vocabulary 
and education around issues of 
mental illness, and, sometimes, lack 
of specific, sensitive, or appropriate 
questioning on the part of the Officer, 
prevent them from adequately 
explaining their experience.
Language Ideology and Time. 
Operating as context for the previous 
two points are the interrelated 
issues of language ideology and 
time. I define “language ideology” 
here, simply, as users’ beliefs (often 
wrong) about the nature of language 
(Silverstein 1979; Wooland and 
Bambi 1994). By “time,” I refer to 
the amount of time an interpreter 
takes to communicate a given 
chunk of language. John Haviland, 
an anthropologist and Tzotzil 
interpreter, is quoted in an LA Times 
article as saying:
“’[Court officials] can get very 
impatient —they can’t see why a simple 
question like ‘Do you waive your right 
to a jury?’ takes three paragraphs to 
translate… [i]n the case of someone 
from an Indian village, there is nothing 
equivalent to a trial or a jury or a legal 
right… I usually have to tell a little 
narrative about what the issues are.’” 
(Kim 2009)
His quote sums up well the issue 
at hand. Court officials become 
“impatient,” reflecting a judgment 
grounded in a belief about language, 
when the interpreter seems to take 
too long to translate a given phrase. 
The underlying belief in question, 
then, must be that languages in 
general are more-or-less similar—
particularly in that a relatively short 
phrase in one language should 
translate into a comparably short 
phrase in another. This belief clashes 
with the reality of English(Spanish)-
Kichwa interpretation, leading to 
frustration, loss of meaning, and, 
perhaps, denial of due process. 
To make matters more 
complicated, this belief (like any 
belief) does not operate on its 
own. Instead, it is intensified by 
two external factors. First, as my 
interviewee Amy pointed out to 
me: in legal proceedings, time is 
money. Asylum Officers, for example, 
are pressured to keep Credible 
Fear Interviews to one hour or 
less, in part because of demands 
on productivity and keeping labor 
costs down. This is particularly the 
case when an interpreter is present, 
since interpreters receive a high 
hourly wage and are paid by the 
Summer 2014 – Spring 2015   |   11
minute.17 And second, the Asylum 
Officers’ instructional materials 
specifically indicate that one sign 
of “misinterpretation” is that “[t]he 
interpreter uses many more words 
to interpret the question than the 
question appears to have required” 
(USCIS 2012e, 17). Conversely, 
the lesson says nothing about 
interpreters needing additional 
time/words depending on the 
language. These two external factors, 
then, exacerbate the effects of a 
misguided belief about the nature 
of interpretation and linguistic 
diversity. One interviewee even 
reported a story in which s/he was 
interpreting telephonically, and, 
because of perceptions around 
length of interpretation, was cut off 
without notice by an Immigration 
Judge, and later reprimanded by his/
her employer. As my collaborator 
Amy stated, regarding Kichwa 
interpreting in general: 
A: The idea can be interpreted, I 
just think that you have to have a 
much wider latitude as to what 
the interpreter can do in order 
to make [the languages] mesh. 
Not even mesh, that they’re 
understood. That the client 
understands what—that both 
parties understand what’s going on.
For this section’s purposes, it is 
sufficient to note that, for Kichwa, 
the “wider latitude” Amy refers 
to must include extra time, and 
a tolerance for seemingly lengthy 
interpretations.
Other Working Conditions. Finally, 
a few assorted issues around 
working conditions remain to be 
addressed. First, there is the issue 
of training. Sometimes, interpreters 
of Indigenous languages have no 
training at all; for example, they 
are, occasionally, recruited at local 
restaurants and hired on a one-
time-only basis. Other times, as 
with Amy and Kinti, their training 
does not contain specific content 
about working with Indigenous 
languages. Following Marisol León, I 
believe that more training programs 
for Indigenous languages are 
needed (León 2014). While creating 
programs for each distinct language 
may not be realistic, interpreters 
for all Indigenous languages are 
bound to face similar problems, so 
generalized trainings should be 
feasible. Second, there is the issue of 
recognizing dialectal variation. All 
three of my interviewees reported 
either interpreting, or being asked 
to interpret, dialects of the Quechua 
language other than Ecuadorian 
Kichwa. As stated before, the 
difference between these “dialects” 
can be as great as those between 
the different Romance “languages.” 
Inter-dialectal interpretation may 
be acceptable in a cooperative 
medical setting, for example, but 
it should never be used in high-
stakes, typically adversarial legal 
settings (Mikkelson 2008). And 
third, there is the issue of breaks. 
Put simply, my interview data 
suggest that Indigenous language 
interpreters, probably due to their 
scarcity, are sometimes asked to 
work for multiple hours without 
a break. Interpretation scholars 
and the National Association of 
Judiciary Interpreters and Translators 
(NAJIT) agree that interpreters need 
regular, frequent breaks in order 
to continue interpreting effectively 
(e.g. NAJIT 2007). While these 
assorted working conditions do not 
point to issues as profound as the 
previous themes discussed, they are 
absolutely capable of undermining 
a proceeding’s fairness. They, 
therefore, merit consideration, and 
present easy targets for reform.
IV. COnCLuSIOn
In conclusion, via all of the above, 
I have sought to support the 
claim that intermeshed issues of 
language, culture, and class, along 
with various procedural issues, 
are likely leading officials to deny 
Kichwa speakers’ Credible Fear 
claims, and applications for relief, 
at an excessive rate18. In doing so, 
I have had to face the complexity 
of analyzing a charged legal 
proceeding informed by various 
histories and larger contexts. It is, 
for example, imprudent to discuss 
a Kichwa speaker’s utterances in a 
Credible Fear Interview without an 
understanding of what it means to 
be a monolingual Kichwa speaker in 
the Ecuadorian context. By the same 
token, it is impossible to understand 
an Asylum Officer’s positive or 
negative Credible Fear determination 
without understanding the current 
US political climate regarding 
immigrants. I have done my best 
to provide the necessary context to 
make intelligible these interactions 
between Kichwa speakers and the 
US immigration system. There 
remains, however, substantial room 
for research on both my particular 
topic and related topics. For example, 
sociolinguistic studies of Credible 
Fear Interviews that are based on 
direct observation are necessary 
for understanding the specific 
mechanisms through which claims 
are (or are not) unjustly denied. 
And furthermore, such studies 
are necessary for determining the 
effects of the Asylum Division’s 
2014 changes in protocol. Direct 
observation-based analysis of 
Asylum Merits Hearings would be 
equally valuable, and, in all cases, 
such research is especially crucial for 
cases where Indigenous language 
interpretation is used (i.e. where the 
chances for miscarriage of justice 
are higher). Ultimately, my hope 
would be that such research would 
serve the Indigenous applicants 
themselves, not in an isolated sense, 
but as part of a larger effort to create 
a more humane immigration system: 
17 In immigration proceedings, payment for interpreters is likely coming from the Lionbridge corporation, which received a $100,000,000 DOJ 
contract in 2009 to provide interpreting services for the EOIR.
18 Again, I base this claim on my qualitative data and the available quantitative evidence.
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one that recognizes the transnational 
and diasporic nature of the world 
today. One that, for example, allows 
Kichwa speakers who have suffered 
harm in their communities to decide 
to migrate to the US, where they can 
reunite with family—rather than 
sending them back to those who 
hurt them, or insisting that they 
should relocate to unfriendly cities in 
their “home” country.
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aPPEndIx a
Practical recommendations
• Extra latitude and time to interpret 
for Indigenous language interpreters 
as a matter of common practice
• Regular breaks for all interpreters
• More thorough education on 
country conditions for asylum 
officers, including relevant languages 
and migrant networks
• Critical consideration of 
Department of State’s Country 
Report which downplays Ecuadorian 
State complicity in oppression
• Use of interpreter pre-CFI so 
applicant can receive legal counsel 
• Accommodation for narrative 
preferences (essentially: allowing 
applicant to tell her story freely, 
rather than structuring through rigid 
Q & A) (see Conley and Barr 1990; 
Cade 2011)
• Release on own recognizance as 
default for Indigenous language 
speakers so they may access 
resources through community19
• Development of specialized training 
for Indigenous language interpreters
• Conferences for Indigenous 
language interpreters, and, thereby, 
creation of network among 
interpreters (a suggestion I owe to 
my interviewee, Amy)
19 A suggestion I owe to Virginia Raymond, JD, who requested such in a Dec. 10, 2014 letter to Jeh Johnson and Eric Holder.
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